Today isn’t National Barbecue Day. Take a moment to remember all those who left behind all they knew and gave all they had in the service of their country.
A new memoir by retired Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz revisits the decision by then-Secretary Robert Gates to shut down the F-22 Raptor production line well short of the service’s calculated minimum operational requirement. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been tremendously expensive for the United States, both in lives and money. As time goes on, we may find the largest cost of those conflicts was to cause such an intense focus on counterinsurgency warfare that our higher-end capabilities were allowed to atrophy. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States has considered Russia and China “near peer competitors” — in short, not quite the superpower America is. That situation is changing more rapidly than many planners anticipated even a decade ago. China fielded its first operational stealth aircraft years before expected. While they are still having some growing pains, this development invalidated some of the reasoning behind shutting down the F-22 — that the U.S. Air Force was largely untouchable.
…Schwartz’s predecessor General Mike Moseley “never gave up in his principled attempts to get those 381 F-22s” the book states. That push ended up getting Moseley fired along with his civilian counterpart, Air Force Secretary Mike Wynn. After the culling, the brass thought that the new bomber was simply too important and that the chances of winning both the F-22 and bomber arguments with Gates, who was staunchly averse to building high-priced weapons that couldn’t be used in Iraq or Afghanistan, was next to zero.
Schwartz, in an attempt to see if a reduced F-22 production number would be palatable to the Defense Secretary, executed an independent assessment that ended up stating 243 F-22s was the absolute minimum the force could get by with. But Gates balked at that number as well.
In the end, the production line was shut down after only 188 Raptors were built. The F-22 is designed to ensure air supremacy by sweeping adversaries’ aircraft from the skies. For context, it is assuming that role from the 1970s-vintage F-15 Eagle, of which the Air Force procured nearly 900 over the decades since its debut. That number does not include the 225 F-15E “Strike Eagles” specially designed with more focus on ground attack missions than air-to-air operations. The F-15 production line continues to operate today, fielding orders from major U.S. allies more than a dozen years after the United States bought its last Eagle.
In short, the U.S. bought far too few Raptors, and now has no option to build more (the production line having been dismantled). The Air Force was able to replenish its F-15 fleet over the years, purchasing newer aircraft and retiring older airframes. This will not be an option for the F-22 design, as reopening production is cost-prohibitive. As a result of this shortfall, the Air Force has kept a large number of F-15s in service as teammates to the Raptor. But this generates the cost of maintaining four distinct fighter platforms: the F-22, the F-15, the smaller F-16 (most known for its use by the Thunderbird Demonstration Team), and the new F-35 attack aircraft. The F-15 and F-16 were built concurrently as a “high-low” mix: a smaller number of highly capable F-15s to defeat enemy air forces, and considerably more of the less capable (and less expensive) F-16s to operate in a mostly “permissive” environment. The same approach was intended for the F-22 and F-35. With the premature closure of the F-22 line, the Air Force has to choose between keeping the F-15s around longer (adding to budget strain), or shifting some of their air superiority mission to the larger (but less capable) F-16 fleet until sufficient numbers of stealthy F-35s are flying.
This was not the first time the U.S. shot itself in the foot while buying a major aircraft system. The B-2 bomber, which critics love to point out cost more per unit than any aircraft in history, was originally supposed to be a fleet of 100 aircraft. Rattled by the program cost at a time the Cold War was winding down, Congress funding the Air Force for only 21 (of which only 19 are in operation today). After 9/11 the system proved far more versatile than its original mission of nuclear combat with the Soviet Union, flying incredibly long missions non-stop from the U.S. to Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere. Instead of 16 nuclear weapons, the aircraft can carry up to 80 satellite-guided 500-pound bombs, accurately hitting scores of targets on each mission. Such capability creates high demand, but with such a small fleet these demands have worn out the B-2 force and the Air Force is scrambling to produce a replacement system as mentioned in the book excerpt above. It’s arguable an original fleet of 100 aircraft would have reduced or eliminated the need for another design procurement this soon.
But such is the “penny-wise, pound-foolish” ways of government acquisition. The F-22 and B-2 are arguably the most advanced and capable aircraft ever built — and no more of either can be produced because the facilities have shut down. It has been 65 years since an American soldier was lost to enemy airpower — in 1953, during the Korean War. Three generations of military planners have been able to reasonably assume the U.S. would control the skies in any conflict they foresaw.
Our investment decisions in recent years may soon call that assumption into serious question. Penny-wise, pound-foolish is bad, but not nearly as bad as penny-wise, blood-foolish.
As I’ve pointed out before, Leftists — who more often rely on emotional appeals than logical analysis — frequently promote their cause du jour by proclaiming “it’s for the children!” Supposedly if a policy saves “just one life” it’s worth whatever tradeoffs (including essential liberties) are required for it.
Very well, then. Let’s look at how our immigration policies are failing our children, on both sides of the Atlantic:
From New York to Virginia to Texas, schools in areas racked by MS-13 violence are now struggling with a sobering question. What to do when the gang isn’t just in your community, but in your classrooms?
For the past year, the Trump administration has waged a nationwide crackdown on MS-13. Nowhere has this effort been more intense than in Suffolk County, where police say the gang has committed 27 murders since a surge of unaccompanied minors began arriving in 2013…
Starting in 2013, thousands of unaccompanied minors — most from Central America — began entering the United States illegally from Mexico each month, many turning themselves in to authorities. More than 200,000 have been detained, screened and then placed with relatives by the Office of Refugee Resettlement. Nearly 5,000 have been sent to Suffolk County…
“The last couple of years, when we had the unaccompanied children coming, that’s when we saw the change,” he said. By providing vulnerable newcomers with a sense of belonging, MS-13 “became a powerhouse.” A deadly one.
The Obama administration tacitly encouraged the “children’s crusade” flood of ‘unaccompanied minors’ (who aren’t always telling the truth about their age). In doing so, they provided a large cohort of disconnected young people who were prime recruits for an organization like MS-13, which provides structure and an alternative form of ‘family.’ If just one in 20 of the new arrivals fell prey to the gang, that’s 10,000 new members — the equivalent of more than two Army Infantry Brigade Combat Teams. I make this comparison because MS-13 is more than a gang — it is an insurgent-type organization that provides an alternative to government for security, services and support… and violently competes with others for allegiance.
In the United Kingdom children are also being “recruited” into a different, but equally devastating subculture:
As many as 1,000 children are feared to have been drugged and abused by perverts in Telford, Shrops, since the 1980s — but their hell went on for decades as authorities repeatedly failed to stamp out a network of paedophiles in the town…
It is also claimed that social workers knew of the abuse in the 1990s but the police took a decade to launch an investigation, council staff viewed victims as “prostitutes”, and authorities failed to keep details of abusers from Asian communities for fear of “racism”.
Here it’s necessary to pause and explain that in the British press, “Asian” usually refers to Pakistanis. Tens of thousands of Pakistani Muslims have migrated to Britain, and as has been the case with minorities elsewhere in the West, have imposed their cultural norms on their surroundings rather than be assimilated to their new country. Just as American troops have been shocked to find pederasty rampant among our nominal Afghan ‘allies,’ so too are the cultural practices in Pakistan frequently incompatible with established Western standards.
Lucy Lowe, 16, was killed in 2000 along with her mother and sister after her 26-year-old abuser Azhar Ali Mehmood set fire to their house. Cabbie Mehmood targeted Lucy in 1997 and she was just 14 when she gave birth to his daughter…
Lucy’s death was used as a warning to other girls, according to victims. One, drugged and gang raped by nine men two years later, said the threats drove her to attempt suicide. She said: “I was scared my family would die like Lucy’s. I thought they’d only be safe if I killed myself.”
The latest revelations in Britain continue a trend that indicates this is a serious and widespread problem. Worse, the government seems more concerned about keeping the public pacified than it does about solving the issue. More than one report has indicated a concern among law enforcement that openly addressing the issue could make them appear “racist.” Voices that point out the clash of cultural values are punished and silenced.
And thus, under the flag of multiculturalism, does barbarism take strong root. The open- borders-moral-equivalency crowd refuses to acknowledge that importing large numbers of people from other parts of the world means importing practices antithetical to Western Civilization. This doesn’t mean they all fail to recognize it — in fact, some of their leaders consider this dilution a feature rather than a flaw.
For that crowd, it’s not really “about the children.” It’s about their power. If concern for the children convinces you to gut the 2nd Amendment, then they’re all about the kids. But if it causes you to question the unchecked influx of brigades of foreigners and their attendant abuses of children, well, that’s a different matter.
May there be a special place in Hell for those bureaucrats who, through their inaction, are allowing these crimes against the youngest and most vulnerable in our society. And may Justice return to our countries so that we may speed their way to that special place.
Sixteen years. That’s how long it’s been since the worst terrorist attack in American history. A total of 2,996 people dead or never accounted for. Symbols of American power struck without warning: both World Trade center towers and the Pentagon. The actions of informed passengers on a fourth plane likely averted a strike on the White House or Congress.
An entire generation had horrifying visions of previously unimaginable events happening in their own nation, with memories firmly etched into their minds.
They say time heals all wounds. And for the families of those lost that day I hope there is some measure of truth in it. But there is a flip side: such events fade in the public consciousness, such that they no longer inform or shape how the nation acts. To quote the opening of the movie “The Fellowship of the Ring,”
“…some things that should not have been forgotten were lost. History became legend, legend became myth…” (click “continue reading” below to continue)
It seems the President has been swayed by his military advisors (both in and out of uniform) that it’s time to “surge” in Afghanistan again:
…shortly after my inauguration, I directed Secretary of Defense Mattis and my national security team to undertake a comprehensive review of all strategic options in Afghanistan and South Asia. My original instinct was to pull out. And historically, I like following my instincts.
But all my life I’ve heard that decisions are much different when you sit behind the desk in the Oval Office, in other words, when you’re president of the United States. So I studied Afghanistan in great detail and from every conceivable angle. After many meetings, over many months, we held our final meeting last Friday at Camp David with my cabinet and generals to complete our strategy.
I arrived at three fundamental conclusion about America’s core interests in Afghanistan. First, our nation must seek an honorable and enduring outcome worthy of the tremendous sacrifices that have been made, especially the sacrifices of lives. The men and women who serve our nation in combat deserve a plan for victory. They deserve the tools they need and the trust they have earned to fight and to win.
Second, the consequences of a rapid exit are both predictable and unacceptable. 9/11, the worst terrorist attack in our history, was planned and directed from Afghanistan because that country was ruled by a government that gave comfort and shelter to terrorists.
A hasty withdrawal would create a vacuum for terrorists, including ISIS and Al Qaeda, would instantly fill just as happened before Sept. 11. And as we know, in 2011, America hastily and mistakenly withdrew from Iraq. As a result, our hard-won gains slipped back into the hands of terrorist enemies. Our soldiers watched as cities they had fought for and bled to liberate, and won, were occupied by a terrorist group called ISIS. The vacuum we created by leaving too soon gave safe haven for ISIS to spread, to grow, recruit and launch attacks. We cannot repeat in Afghanistan the mistake our leaders made in Iraq.
Third, and finally, I concluded that the security threats we face in Afghanistan and the broader region are immense. Today, 20 U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations are active in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the highest concentration in any region anywhere in the world.
For its part, Pakistan often gives safe haven to agents of chaos, violence and terror. The threat is worse because Pakistan and India are two nuclear-armed states whose tense relations threaten to spiral into conflict….
Surging troops (particularly only 4,000 more) is not a strategy. Killing individual terrorists is not a strategy. These are but tactics. What is the desired end state? It’s proven to be extremely difficult to build a competent, effective Afghan government and army. Only when those exist is there any chance of us offloading this burden without creating the vacuum Trump references. So why isn’t there more emphasis on that? I’m not just talking about training troops (who have a tendency to run away — even when training in the U.S.!). I’m talking about identifying real leaders, people Afghans are willing to rally around, that provide another pole of power besides the Taliban. We may not like the leaders we find; they’re hardly likely to be Jeffersonian types. But if they are committed to fighting the return of the Taliban and ensure Afghanistan doesn’t return to being a terror sanctuary, that should count most.
I really wish our leaders would pick up a book series I’ve recently been reading. It’s written by a disaffected former U.S. Army Lt. Colonel who pulls no punches about the flawed premises under which we’ve operated since 9/11. It’s not easy to read — using a science fiction story as allegory he frequently and graphically lays bare the moral quandaries of this type of war. But as distasteful as some of his recommended approaches might be, one has to wonder if letting this festering sore drag on for 16 years is far worse. Respect for U.S. power has waned, even as our forces have worn down from years of constant use. Maybe it’s time we simply left, and made clear that any nation from which a future attack is launched against will find us, in Kratman’s title quote, making “A Desert Called Peace.” There are easy ways to do so without “boots on the ground.” And in the meantime, we should be hardening our borders and entry processes into America immediately. It’s already long overdue.
Half-measures haven’t gotten us anywhere. We’re too forceful to be loved, but not forceful enough to be feared. Sooner or later we’re going to have to choose one or the other.
“The problem with trying to induce the benefits of nationhood onto Afghanistan is that there’s no nation there. Afghanistan is a more of a blank spot on the map where neighboring nations aren’t.” — Stephen Green, via Instapundit
Many Americans just can’t seem to understand that many people groups don’t want to live like us, and that our efforts to shape them that way is seen as aggression of the highest order. One cannot make a state where there is no national identity. And for much of the Middle East and Central Asia, identity is found in family, kinsmen and tribe. Lines drawn on a map by outsiders mean nothing, as the Pashtuns of both western Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan have shown.
Same is true of Iraq, an artificial conglomerate of Sunni, Shia and Kurds. Left alone without Saddam as the heavy-handed glue to hold them together, the country would fragment and the Kurds would no longer be the largest ethnic group in the world without its own homeland. While I was in Baghdad years ago, President Bush announced our mission had shifted from toppling Saddam to building a free, united and stable Iraq. A quick wit on our team quickly turned that into a drawing on the wall, with the caption of “pick any two.” That’s still the wisest assessment I’ve ever heard about that instance of mission creep.
Notwithstanding efforts to spread the Gospel, it’s time to let others live as they’ve chosen, and stop bringing so many of them here so we can do the same.
…this fellow also says it well (emphasis added by me):
War is and always will be an ugly business.
That knowledge should lead Western governments to use their technological and economic advantages to avoid getting into wars with the barbarians on the edge of civilization. Instead, they start wars they never intend to win, so they can preen and pose about their virtue and morality, when something terrible inevitably happens…
The point of war is to kill the enemy and break up their stuff. The hope is they quit before you kill all of them and break all of their stuff, but you plan otherwise. If the Afghans knew all along that helping Osama bin Laden was most likely going to mean their cities and large towns would be flattened, they would have chose differently. Let’s assume they played it the same and Bush had firebombed Kabul, what would have been the result?
Yeah, there would have been a lot of hand-wringing and pearl clutching in Washington, but every other nutjob in the Middle East would have been re-calibrating his plans. A lot less death and destruction would have come as a result.
Not long after it became clear we were in both Afghanistan and Iraq for an extended engagement, I told a fellow Airman our country was making a huge mistake. Rather than just strike and leave, our country was arrogant enough to believe we could “make democracy bloom” in a soil that has never yet produced it on its own. Americans today have no stomach for the kind of occupation (both scope and duration) it would take to create that level of change in the region. To put it bluntly, unless we’re willing to seal off and occupy the countries until we’ve educated a couple new generations, it ain’t happening (and probably wouldn’t then, either). I said at the time we’d have been better off after 9/11 by turning the Taliban and Kabul into the world’s largest man-made crater as a warning to others, then leaving everyone in literal shock and awe (“Who else wants some of that? Any takers?”). Instead, our half-hearted wars of choice over the last decade and a half have eroded the respect and fear (not to mention the capability) our military once commanded.
You’re not powerful just because you’re throwing military forces around. You’re powerful when nobody dares challenge you, even indirectly, for fear of the deathstroke you’re expected to deliver. That’s the difference between deterrence and playing expensive whack-a-mole all over the earth.
“To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” – Sun Tzu
But failing that,